ΤΣΕΤΣΕΝΙΑ: Οδοιπορικό στο Γκρόζνυ. Αφιέρωμα στα 10 χρόνια πολέμου μέρος Β

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H πόλη-φάντασμα

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Εξω οι Ισλαμιστές φονταμενταλιστές απο το ΙΝΤΥ

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δήθεν αντάρτες. Μισθαρνα οργανα των Σ. Αραβων και της CIA.

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από @ 30/01/2005 1:34 πμ.


ΜΠΑΣΤΑΡΔΕ ΚΝΙΤΗ ΠΟΝΤΙΑΚ ΓΙΑ ΠΕΣ ΜΑΣ ΗΛΙΘΙΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΠΑΙΔΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΤΣΕΤΣΕΝΩΝ ΠΟΥ ΠΕΘΑΙΝΟΥΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΑ ΧΕΡΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΤΣΑΡΟΥ ΠΟΥΤΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΑ ΠΡΑΚΤΟΡΕΣ ΤΙΣ C.I.A. ΕΙΝΑΙ ? ΤΕΤΟΙΑ ΣΑΣ ΛΕΝΕ ΟΙ ΚΟΜΜΙΣΑΡΙΟΙ ΣΑΣ ?

ένα αρθρο σχετικα με την θέση της Ομοσπονδιακής Ρωσίας με την αυτονομη δημοκρατία της Τσετσενίας , μελος του Ομόσπονδου κράτους. Ενα σοβαρό αρθρο, .. σε αντιδιαστολη με την αιματοβαμένη αρθρογραφία των Μουσταφάδων και λοιπών .... WILL RUSSIA AND CHECHNYA COME TO TERMS WITHOUT SIGNING A TREATY? MOSCOW (RIA Novosti political commentator Yuri Filippov) - When the West speaks about a political settlement in Chechnya, it mostly means political talks between the Kremlin and Aslan Maskhadov, the leader of Chechen separatists ("Chechen and international terrorists" as Moscow calls them) and the president of the unrecognized and non-existent Chechen republic of Ichkeria. The Moscow authorities usually comment by saying that Mr. Maskhadov, who is guilty of involvement in terrorist acts against innocent civilians, should be given not talks but irons. And this usually ends Russia-West dialogue on a political settlement in Chechnya. But this does not mean that the Russian authorities do not have a plan for a political settlement in the republic, where a civil war is continuing to drag on. Moreover, they are trying to implement their plan. It was formalized in late 2002, after a group of Chechens took an audience of about 800 hostage in the Dubrovka theatre center in Moscow and kept them for three days. It was the first time the Russian administration came face to face with the threat of the terrorist war spreading beyond Chechnya, and this made it view the problem of interaction with allies in Chechnya very seriously. As a result, the Kremlin opted for Akhmad Kadyrov, a former field commander and, most importantly, the mufti of Chechnya. By that time, he took the federal side and President Putin appointed him head of the Chechen administration. The Russian plan for a political settlement in Chechnya elaborated with the mufti can be called the Putin-Kadyrov plan. Its implementation in 2003 proceeded without a hitch. Chechens approved their constitution at the spring referendum, which described their republic as an inalienable part of Russia, and in summer Moscow thanked Chechnya and personally Mr. Kadyrov by amnestying fighters who were not guilty of grave crimes and were ready to lay down their weapons. The amnestied men soon got their weapons back, though, as most of them became members of the local paramilitary police headed by Mr. Kadyrov's son Ramzan. That autumn, Akhmad Kadyrov was elected president, and Moscow soon fulfilled one more point of its political settlement plan by reducing its military presence in the republic and officially entrusting part of military powers to Ramzan Kadyrov's police. Only the assassination of President Kadyrov on May 9, 2004 interfered with the main task on the Putin-Kadyrov plan - the signing of a treaty on the delimitation of powers between Russia and Chechnya. The treaty was crucial economically, as it gave Chechnya the right to retain returns from the sale of its oil in the republican budget. But its political importance was overwhelming, as a document signed by Mr. Putin and Mr. Kadyrov would have sealed the republic's right to differ from other members of the Russian Federation (which incorporates 20 other national republics). The signing of such a treaty had been the dream of two Chechen presidents, Dudayev and Maskhadov, and, if we disregard the separatist demagogy about "full independence of Chechnya from Russia," the treaty was the main political goal of their 10-year-long war. But Akhmad Kadyrov was killed and the future of the delimitation treaty became vague. At first, there was nobody to sign it in Chechnya. The issue was clarified on August 29, when Interior Minister Alu Alkhanov was elected president, proclaimed his commitment to Mr. Kadyrov's policy, and promised the people to sign a political treaty with Moscow. But three days later, on September 1, bandits took hostage children in a Beslan school, putting in question the preservation of stability in the North Caucasus. Immediately afterwards, Mr. Putin launched a political reform in Russia. The main element of that reform has been formalized: the heads of Russian republics will not be elected by the people as before but appointed by local parliaments upon the recommendation of the Russian President. According to the new law, the Russian President can dismiss regional heads without coordinating the decision with the regional lawmakers. This provision is applicable also to Chechnya: Though Mr. Alkhanov's presidential term will expire only in four years, Moscow already views him as an element in the integral vertical mechanism of power. And it would be senseless to sign a political treaty on the delimitation of powers with a subordinate, a man whom the Russian President may dismiss at will. However, the need for a political settlement in Chechnya has not evaporated, and powers must still be delimited between the federal center and the Chechen republic. The other day Taus Dzhabrailov, the chairman of the Chechen Council of State, announced that the draft treaty was ready for signing, and the officials of the Chechen office in Moscow said the issue should be settled in March. Judging by the Kremlin administration's cool reaction, the statements were premature. Though Russia is prepared to grant major economic privileges to the republic (possibly including the transfer of taxes collected in the republic to the local budget), this does not mean that Moscow views Grozny as even a roughly equal political entity or that it would exchange ratification papers with it. The best solution in this situation would be to adopt a federal law on Chechnya, with approximately the same economic core meaning as that stipulated in the draft treaty. After it has been coordinated with the concerned parties, the law could be discussed by the Chechen parliament (it is to be elected this autumn) and later adopted by the Federal Assembly of Russia. Mr. Putin would sign the document, not as a treaty but as a federal law. It would be more acceptable to Moscow politically, since this would not disrupt its legal relations with other Federation members and would not create a precedent that other national republics might attempt to repeat. This decision would have a highly positive influence on public opinion in Chechnya and show that Moscow can make concessions if its reasonable interests are not encroached upon. Some Chechens might even view this as proof that their war with Russia was not useless and now they have the right to peace. Will Russia and Chechnya come to terms without signing a treaty? The future of the political settlement in Chechnya in the internal sense, as Grozny and Moscow wanted from the beginning, depends on the answer to this question.

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με την χρηματοδοτηση των ΗΠΑ ---------------- Ο αιματοβαμενος Μουσταφάς ας κάνει την συγκριση ώστε να καταλάβει που εχουν ριξει οι ομοιοί του την περιοχή

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