αναζητώ κείμενο βιβλίου

υποκεφάλαιο βιβλίου.

Ψάχνω υποκεφάλαιο "Cyprus and EOKA" του βιβλίου:Terrorism: A History, 2nd Edition Randall D. Law ISBN: 978-0-7456-9089-6. σελ 197-201.

Το έχω ψάξει μέσω sci-hub αλλά δεν το δίνει. Αν το έχει κάποιος, είτε σε pdf, είτε να στείλει print screen ή φωτο των συγκεκριμένων σελίδων, θα είμαι υπόχρεως.

από παπάκις 16/10/2017 2:26 μμ.



από c 16/10/2017 3:05 μμ.

Cyprus and EOKA

At nearly the same time that the United Kingdom was successfully
confronting ethno-nationalist terrorism in Malaya and Kenya, trouble
was brewing in a third British possession, Cyprus. On this Eastern
Mediterranean island approximately forty miles from the Turkish coast,
the lessons of the Irgun/LEHI campaign were put to devastating effect.
In fact, the situation on Cyprus was not unlike that of Palestine: antagonistic
Greeks and Turks found themselves ruled by an imperial power.
Greek Cypriots (who comprised about 80 percent of the population)
found a determined leader in General George Grivas, a veteran of the
anti-Nazi resistance and anti-communist fi ghting in the Greek Civil War.
His hope echoed that of many Greek Cypriots: union (enosis) with the
mainland. Grivas assessed the strengths of the Greek Cypriot community
and quickly concluded that there were insuffi cient weapons or trained
fi ghters for even a limited guerrilla war against the British. He did identify
two advantages: the broad support of the Greek Cypriot population
who could shelter and support a terrorist movement; and links to Radio
Athens, a broadcast service that could provide Grivas the international
attention he believed would lead to enosis.
Grivas organized the few fi ghters he had – perhaps only eighty at fi rst –
into the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (known as EOKA from
its Greek acronym) and began operations in April 1955. Grivas strictly
limited EOKA’s attacks – what he called “executions” or “sabotage” – to
British policemen, soldiers, and urban infrastructure, a strategy that preserved
public support and produced maximum visibility. EOKA fi ghters
operated at will and frustrated British attempts to govern effectively. Worst
of all, the British reacted as they had in Northern Ireland and Palestine,
resorting to collective punishment against civilians in the form of harassment,
curfews, mass arrests, enormous fi nes, and indiscriminate beatings
and shootings. “The ‘security forces,’” Grivas later noted, “set about their
work in a manner which might have been deliberately designed to drive
the population into our arms” (quoted in Asprey, War in the Shadows,
II:895). EOKA proved particularly adept at provoking the British into
self-defeating outbursts against civilians. One of the most notorious incidents
was the detonation of a large bomb at a soccer fi eld used by off-duty
soldiers. The blast killed two and wounded fi ve. The British regiment so
struck “rushed through the village beating and kicking everyone they met,
smashing windows and ransacking shops for anything worth stealing”
(Grivas, Memoirs, 96). Compounding the problem, the British exiled the
relatively moderate Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios III, thus
depriving themselves of a negotiating partner and leaving Greek Cypriots
with little option but to back Grivas’ radical strategy.
Meanwhile, as Grivas noted, “The British answer to our methods
was to fl ood the island with troops. It was the wrong answer. Numbers
have little meaning in guerrilla warfare” (Grivas, Memoirs, 46). By 1956,
thirty thousand British soldiers and police were hunting down about
275 EOKA fi ghters and 750 armed village irregulars (Asprey, War in
the Shadows, II:894). The absurd ratio provided EOKA with plenty of
targets, emphasized the population’s impression of the British as foreign
occupiers, and heightened the cost of failure. As EOKA mounted more
and more attacks, the British reputation fell to previously unimaginable
lows. At this moment, enosis, EOKA’s ultimate goal, seemed within sight.
The British had tired of their involvement with Cyprus, which they had
come to see as an expensive and humiliating albatross that provided little
strategic value in return. But several developments thwarted the realization
of union with Greece. British attempts to negotiate a solution with
Greece repeatedly infl amed Turkish nationalism, as did EOKA attacks
against those Turkish Cypriot police and civilians who cooperated with
the British. And although EOKA gained the international attention it had
sought, United Nations’ involvement meant that a unilateral decision
by the British was no longer possible. With enosis out of the question,
Grivas and other Greek Cypriot leaders settled for independence and de
facto partition in 1960.
Grivas and Greece’s military junta eventually backed a new incarnation
of EOKA – known as EOKA B – which revived the struggle for
enosis. It targeted Greek Cypriot leaders and civilians seen as insuffi -
ciently patriotic, particularly those on the left, as well as Turkish Cypriot
civilians. While most Greek Cypriots regarded EOKA as freedom fi ghters,
EOKA B was widely denounced as a terrorist organization, due to
its use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. EOKA B also helped
trigger repeated Greek and Turkish military interventions, which have
kept tensions high and the situation unresolved. The UN has maintained
a peacekeeping mission on Cyprus since 1964, the third longest-running
operation of this sort. The result has been a mixed legacy for Cyprian
political violence. Terrorism played an even more pivotal role in the
winning of Cyprian independence than it had in the creation of Israel,
but the results were less decisive. The example of Cyprian terrorism illuminates
two lessons repeatedly demonstrated in the history of terrorism.
First, terrorists rarely are the ones to reap whatever victory is eventually
gained, and second, terrorists prove more able to destabilize a state than
to construct a lasting and peaceful order.

από μμ 17/10/2017 μεσημέρι

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